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Excerpts from pages 80-81
An “opinion” from an appellate court such as the U.S.
Supreme Court is unlike any other document produced by
any other branch of government. Even split-vote opinions
are the result of equal, binding, independent, and
single-minded debate. They are remarkably collegial,
given that they are handed down by a group that has no
peers, no superiors, and a chief whose administrative
responsibility is greater than the rest but who
nevertheless has only one vote.
While individual justices often differ in their social
values and philosophy, they share a common discipline of
the law and fidelity to the Court. They have no
constituency, no party, and no “higher court.” Most
important, they respect each other’s opinions in a way
that diminishes pride of authorship and honors deeply
held convictions.
The Miranda opinion contains inordinately long
sentences professing arcane Latin maxims upon which so
much of our Anglo-Saxon law is based.
It is imbedded in principle,
clothed in scholarly material,
and limited to a specific brand of custodial
interrogation.
It is both eloquent and prophetic.
It is nevertheless quite specific:
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s
constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the
confession and affirmed the conviction [citation
omitted]. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized
heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically
request counsel. We reverse. From the testimony of the
officers and by the admission of respondent, it is clear
that Miranda was not in any way appraised of his right
to consult with an attorney and to have one present
during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be
compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected
in any other manner. Without these warnings, the
statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he
signed a statement, which contained a typed-in clause
stating that he had “full knowledge” of his “legal
rights,” does not approach the knowing and intelligent
waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.
[Citations omitted]
Thus was the procedural gateway for the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination set
forth in nonconstitutional terms for the first time. In
supporting this opinion, Chief Justice Warren was joined
by Justices Black, Douglas, Fortas, and Brennan. Justice
Harlan, with whom Justices Stewart and White joined,
dissented. Justice White wrote a separate dissenting
opinion, as did Justice Clark. Whereas most Supreme
Court opinions are simply filed with the clerk of the
court and mailed to the parties, in this case, Chief
Justice Warren read the full sixty-plus-page opinion
aloud in the Supreme Courtroom on Monday, June 13, 1966.
In a voice laden with emotion, Chief Justice Warren made
clear the connection between the Fifth Amendment
privilege and the new right - the right of silence - by
saying, “At the outset, if a person in custody is to be
subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in
clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to
remain silent.”
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